Bangladesh-US : Towards new engagements

Delwar Hossain

The third round of the 2014 Bangladesh US security dialogue was held in Dhaka on 22 April. It focused on issues such as peacekeeping, counter‐terrorism, disaster‐management, maritime security and regional security. 

The security dialogue is part of a larger dialogue process that encompasses defence‐to‐defense dialogue; military‐to‐military dialogue; security dialogue; and partnership dialogue between Dhaka and Washington. This security dialogue has been taking place annually since 2012. The first two‐day meeting to bolster bilateral and regional cooperation between the two countries under the Joint Declaration of the Bangladesh‐US Partnership Dialogue took place in Washington, in September 2012. On the economic front, the first meeting of Trade and 

Investment Cooperation Forum Agreement (TICFA) between Bangladesh and the US was held in April 2014. The TICFA seeks to further bolster the annual bilateral trade – that exceeded $6 billion in 2013 – between the Dhaka and Washington. 

Amid conflicting positions of Bangladesh and the US over several domestic, bilateral and global issues, one may interpret these meetings as puzzling developments. In the post‐election period, at the bilateral level, both the countries have continued with old discords on issues such as labour rights, the Yunus factor, the duty‐free, quota‐free market access, and the suspension of Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) facilities to Bangladesh, among others. From a Bangladeshi perspective, the US’ stance on domestic political changes in the former is a major irritant to smooth bilateral relations. The US’ insistence on holding credible and inclusive general elections in Bangladesh afresh – after the January 2014 elections – has created a diplomatic challenge for the incumbent Sheikh Hasina government. Globally, the Kosovo and the Crimea questions clearly demonstrate Bangladesh’s different foreign policy priorities. 

However, despite the continuing discord, Bangladesh and the US have remained engaged – as demonstrated via the dialogue process and the maiden meeting of TICFA. A strong view prevails in the policy community that these meetings will put US–Bangladesh relations on the path to recovery. Unlike in the past, the US has made it clear that preventing the spread of global terrorism and strategic understanding are its foremost agendas vis‐à‐vis Bangladesh. Both countries have developed three structured fora for mutual engagement. They are: the US‐Bangladesh Dialogue on Security Issues; the Bangladesh‐US Partnership Dialogue; and the US–Bangladesh TICFA. The US recognises that Bangladesh has a vital role in ensuring security and stability regionally and globally.  As the head of the US delegation to the Security Dialogue, Tom Kelly, observed, “A strong bilateral partnership and improved defense ties between Bangladesh and the United States are in both of our interests.... In a broader perspective US values Bangladesh's geographical location. It sees an important role for Bangladesh in the overall security context of the Middle East, and Indian‐Pacific‐Oceans region. This is why US wants Bangladesh by its side in its strategic pursuits.” 

Thus, for the US, geostrategic developments in the South Asian and the Asia Pacific regions have accorded Bangladesh a degree of importance. This is also linked to the shift of the 2010 US defence strategy, that the US cannot go solo, and in its attempt to address primary 

security issues, countries like Bangladesh matter. 

Interestingly, Bangladesh appeared to be shy of expressing much optimism and enthusiasm, specifically regarding the outcomes of the meetings, and on bilateral ties in general. The head of the Bangladesh delegation mentioned that the dialogue was “very fruitful” and appreciated the US for the institutionalisation of the process of talks for intensive bilateral cooperation. The apparent lack of buoyant attitude on Bangladesh’s part reflects frustration about the US for its continuing emphasis on holding fresh elections in Bangladesh. It is also a reflection of Washington’s denial of the GSP facilities and duty free‐quota free access. 

However, in reality Bangladesh shows a degree of pragmatism while dealing with the US in the current context. The benefits of Bangladesh‐US bilateral ties – from trade to investment, and from culture to development – are substantive for both the nations. Although the rules of engagement for Dhaka and Washington have been crafted in a new regional environment in South Asia, the issue of the security dialogue may generate disquiet among regional powers such as China and India. Simultaneously, the US may also find it little troubling when Bangladesh joined the naval exercise with China along with India and Pakistan. In April 2014, ships from Bangladesh, Pakistan and India reached the Chinese port of Qingdao to partake in a rare naval exercise 

On the Sino‐Bangladesh naval cooperation, Tom Kelly asserts that the US fully respects Bangladesh's sovereign right to establish cooperation with any other country. Similarly, the Indian High Commissioner to Bangladesh,

Pankaj Saran, maintains that “It is up to you [Bangladesh] to choose a strategic partner. India has nothing to say in the matter.” 

The first TICFA meeting may vindicate the critics that the US would use the platform to create a new regime for protecting its economic interests in Bangladesh, thereby undermining the latter’s development needs. Bangladesh’s opposition to form a women’s economic empowerment committee and a labour affairs committee in the first Meeting is an example. The TICFA and/or the Security Dialogue may open new avenues of bilateral talks, but Dhaka and Washington need to deal with major issues of mutual discord. Under the Westphalian order, attempts to use domestic politics as a diplomatic instrument may undermine gains of bilateral cooperation between the two.

Preventing an Afghan meltdown

Syed Mansur Hashim

THAT the United States (US) has put limitations on what actions the allied forces will perform in Afghanistan under the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) leaves much to be desired, at least as long as the new Afghan government is concerned. 12,500 troops on the ground from January 1, 2015 with nearly 10,000 coming from the US alone, are supposed to hold in check the Taleban and its allies. However, given the guidelines of the BSA, this force will help transfer the bulk of the fighting to the estimated 350,000 Afghan National Forces (ANF). 

Voices are deeply divided as to precisely how effective this new policy will be. The plan as it stands envisages the ANF to head national security by 2017. The political climate is altogether not too glum. The third democratically elected government is in power. The billions of dollars invested in the country over the more than one decade of western engagement in the country has helped improve Afghanistan's “capacity for self-governance, improved national health care, expanded schooling opportunities for Afghan youth, especially girls, and a better connected Afghanistan to the outside world than ever before. Afghanistan also began 2015 with a 350,000-member security force consisting of an army, a limited air force, national police and border and customs forces.”(Source: Foreign Policy Research Institute)

The flipside to this rosy picture is that a large percentage of the Afghan populace still suffers from extreme poverty. Being a landlocked country does not help the country in terms of trade and the overt dependence on foreign aid remains the Achilles heel. There is also a massive shortage of housing for nearly half the population. There is simply no denying the fact that many of the “gains” Afghanistan has achieved since 2002 were funded by multilateral agencies and these include both the building of infrastructure and institutions. Salaries of both the bureaucracy and the military are dependent on foreign aid. What is sad to see is that despite sitting on some of significant deposits of precious minerals like copper, lithium, uranium, iron ore, cobalt, natural gas and oil, foreign investment has not been forthcoming primarily due to the fluid political situation on the ground. 

It is not without reason that the Taleban refuse to go away. There is no doubt that the Taleban's principal supporters in the Pakistan military and intelligence community continue to patronise the group in an effort to influence the political discourse in Afghanistan. The increased intelligence sharing between India and Afghanistan and the growing cosy relationship between these two countries on military matters make the Taleban dilemma a festering wound in Afghan politics. With India now giving more direct military aid to ANF in terms of training and equipping, the stage is set for the Taleban to remain very much present in Afghanistan. Precisely how the US hopes to counter the growing fear that Afghanistan will become the country of choice for militant organisations where they train and use it as a base to counter Western interests in the region remain to be seen; especially with a much reduced force of less than 10,000 personnel on the ground.

Despite the impressive numbers, the Afghan army has been less than effective in countering the Taleban in the south, the east and in the capital city itself. This is so because the US-led allied forces are no longer there. Indeed the Afghan forces have actually ceded ground to the Taleban in areas in the south and east…gains that had come after much fighting between the US-led allies and the Taleban in years gone by. Going by numbers, ANF has sustained 4,600 deaths in October, 2014 alone. It has serious deficiencies in intelligence support, in medical evacuation and / or supporting fire in terms of artillery and air bombardment. The bottom line is that 2014 has not been a good year to boost foreign investment confidence in the country. Without foreign investment to replace donor-handouts, there is serious doubt Afghanistan will be able to hold its own in the mid to long term. The drastic pullout from Afghanistan without putting into place the challenges of logistics, an intelligence backbone, without training and equipping air support and counter-insurgency forces will all collude to a dramatic turn of events in Afghanistan in the coming year, one that will hardly help in making “the world a safer place from terrorism.”

So what can be done? It is imperative that the US commit itself to build up a workable intelligence gathering and sharing framework in Afghanistan and beyond. The ANF is still in its infancy when it comes to combating militant outfits and requires direct military support in its operations. There is also the need to comprehend that there is no alternative to training and maintaining an “operational military presence in Afghanistan.” These key elements need to be worked into a revised BSA. The alternative is to let things lie as they are and watch as Afghanistan descends into another Iraq-type situation. The only problem with that is that the problems associated with militancy will spiral beyond the borders of Afghanistan onto neighbouring countries and beyond.